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ABSTRACT
We compare the convergence with German monetary policy of the monetary policy of transition-
economy candidates for EU membership, of non-transition candidates and of  countries that have
recently joined the EU. We find significant long- and short-run linkages between German base
money stock and that of the most recent members of the EU; the same holds true for the non-
transition economy candidates. Among the transition economies, the ability to follow the policies
of the Bundesbank is weaker or, for some countries, nonexistent. Such weak policy coordination
may reflect the need for building up the financial sectors of these countries and allowing for a
period in which they tie their policies more closely to that of the ECB.3
I. Introduction
The successful accession to membership in the European Union (EU) by the current
transition-economy applicants, the Czech Republic, Hungary, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia
Poland and the Baltic republics, will depend to a large extent on their ability to align themselves
with the institutions and the macroeconomic policies of the EU. Although structural change and
institutional adaptation to EU norms will also be important in this process, in this paper we focus
on the convergence of monetary policy between the candidate countries and the EU. The
convergence of monetary policy between the EU and the candidate countries will be a necessary,
though by no means sufficient, condition for establishing exchange rate stability between the
Euro zone and the newly joining countries.  We examine the prospects for such a convergence of
monetary policies by investigating the extent to which the candidate countries have been able to
achieve some measure of convergence between the evolution of their money stock with that of
Germany, which we use as a historical proxy for the future monetary policy stance of the
European Central Bank (ECB). We also compare the convergence achieved by the five most
advanced transition-economy candidate countries to that achieved by countries that have recently
become members of the EU, by several non-transition candidate countries and by some transition
economies whose candidacy for EU membership has been deferred because they are making
slower progress toward stabilizing their economies and introducing market mechanisms and
institutions.
 In the next section of the paper we motivate the inquiry and describe the exchange rate
regime that is likely to govern the relations between the new members of the EU and the current
members. We expect this exchange rate regime to display a tighter relationship between the4
national currencies of the new members and the Euro than is allowed under the conditions of
ERM II. Based on this characterization, we argue that, if the candidate countries were successful
in having Germany "dominate" their monetary policy in recent years in the way that Germany
was alleged to dominate the policies of other EU countries under the EMS, then the transition
economies should have the potential to conform to the monetary policies of the ECB. The
statistical tests of this domination of candidate-country monetary policy by Germany are
developed and presented in Section 3 and the implications of these findings and the inter-country
comparisons drawn from them are set out in Section 4.
2. EU Membership and Monetary Convergence
Much as the Maastricht criteria played a key role in the creation of a common currency
among some of the EU member countries, macroeconomic performance will play a key role in
determining which of the transition economies will join the EU and when. Indeed, the
introduction of the Euro among a core subset of EU countries makes macroeconomic
convergence a more pressing issue than it was for earlier entrants into the EU. As McKinnon
(1999, p. 132) points out, the gains to the transition-economy candidates from joining the EU
will only be realized if “trade takes place over an exchange-rate regime that is mutually
acceptable between East and West".  McKinnon argues that a regime of fixed exchange rates
between the candidate countries and the Euro is the regime most likely to inspire such mutual
confidence and to realize the full benefits of integration. In part this is so because fixed exchange
rates between the currencies of these new member countries and the Euro will facilitate the rapid
growth of the new members' exports to the rest of the EU without raising fears of "beggar-thy-5
neighbor devaluations or unfair trading practices".
1 Moreover, a credible adherence to a Euro peg
will serve as an important spur to the structural and institutional changes required of the
transition economies, thus guaranteeing to the EU that its new members will not backslide in
their efforts at structural and institutional reform.  As for the non-transition candidates for EU
membership, although they do not face as great a task in creating economic and social
institutions consistent with EU membership as do the transition-economy candidates, they, too,
face the need to align their exchange rate closely to the Euro to realize the benefits of
membership.
Indeed, the fast-track transition-economy candidates for EU membership already have
relatively tight links to the Euro, links that are quite consistent with McKinnon's proposed
regime.
2 Estonia fixes its currency to the Euro while Poland and Hungary utilize a crawling peg
to a basket whose largest component is the Euro. Slovenia and the Czech Republic have a
managed float, although statements by the officials of the Czech National Bank suggest the
existence of an informal peg to the  D-mark, making the koruna's de facto exchange rate regime
much less flexible than its de jure status would suggest. Of course, a peg established in the
framework of EU accession would have to be seen as being more credible and durable than the
voluntarily established exchange rate arrangements now in place. Moreover, as Wellink (1999,
p.140) points out, "… any formal link to the euro should be preceded by policy measures which
make the envisaged currency link a credible one."  Among the policy measures that most
observers would view as important markers of credibility for such an exchange rate  link are
                                               
1 McKinnon does envisage the possibility of a new member adopting a crawling peg against the Euro if its inflation
is too high.
2 The major difference is that most of the transition economies have liberalized short-term capital flows while
McKinnon proposes capital controls to make the peg to the Euro more credible.6
indicators such as the  inflation rate, the current account, macroeconomic policy,  interest rates,
productivity and employment,  and indebtedness.
However much observers can agree on the formal markers of stability and
macroeconomic convergence, the process of transition itself renders highly problematic any
quantitative judgment regarding the values that these markers should take in order to make a
currency peg credible. Consider for example the inflation rate. The transition economies are
undergoing considerable restructuring, and this restructuring will generate large and persistent
Balassa-Samuelson effects (Kopits, 1999). In addition, a large gap exists between the price level
of the transition economies and those of the EU member countries (Jana￿ková, 2000; Richards
and Tersman, 1996). Large Balassa-Samuelson effects mean that there is scope for a
corresponding real appreciation of the equilibrium exchange rate that would come about through
rates of inflation that exceeded those in the EU. Because the ex ante measurement of the Balassa-
Samuelson effect is fraught with considerable difficulty, a policy of targeting inflation to a level
equal to the sum of the EU 's rate of inflation plus the Samuelson -Balassa effect is impractical at
best and quite dangerous to the long-term viability of a peg to the Euro at worst. Price
equalization in the presence of a peg also requires that the transition economy maintain a rate of
inflation that exceeds that of the EU, but, as with the Balassa-Samuelson effect, with a
differential that cannot be accurately predicted. 
3 The transition economies will also continue to
experience greater relative price changes that those occurring in the EU, and this factor, too, will
contribute to higher rates of inflation in the transition countries (Coorey et al., 1998). In addition,
inflation rates in transition economies may not properly reflect actions of central banks because
of the periodic liberalization of administered prices and because of the introduction of, or
                                               
3 See Mateus (1999, pp. 164-166) for Portugal's experience with price convergence in the process of entry into the
EU.7
increases in the rates of, VAT and fuel taxes, which serve as random inflationary impulses. In
sum, inflation in the transition economies at rates higher than the EU average should be expected
after accession, but there is no effective way of gauging ex ante whether the resulting real
appreciation  is so large as to undermine the credibility of that peg, and, thus, even medium-term
convergence of inflation rates is not a good indicator of the credibility of a transition economy's
peg to the Euro.
Similar reservations can be raised about the use of other traditional markers of
macroeconomic performance.  For example, interest rates in these countries are unlikely to
reflect EU levels or cyclical fluctuations, even if the transition economies were to follow closely
the monetary policies of the ECB. In part this is due to the large differences in risk faced by
depositors in the transition economies and in the EU. In the transition economies there remain
banks whose loan portfolios are troubled by non-performing loans and problems of moral hazard
as firms struggle to survive by accumulating debts that may never be repaid, and, as a result,
risks in transition economies are much higher than they are in the EU. On the other hand, the
return to capital may also be higher than it is in the EU due to the opportunities offered by the
restructuring of economic activity. Finally, government policy has acted to preserve a high
spread between lending and deposit rates as a way of helping the banking system deal with losses
from problem loans. Likewise, given the great changes in resource allocation in the transition
economies and the problems of establishing a proper social safety net and socially acceptable
means of bargaining over wages, the evolution of  the natural rate of unemployment in transition
economies will also be hard to define (Cross, 2000).
This leaves the money stock as the best measure of convergence between the transition
economy candidates for EU membership and the Euro-zone countries. If the candidate countries8
are able to follow the policies of the ECB in terms of a monetary aggregate target, then, as their
financial systems mature and as the transitory effects of transition on inflation and interest rates
recede, they will be able to achieve the same outcomes in terms of inflation and interest rates as
are achieved by the ECB. In the meantime, so long as they can mimic ECB policies regarding the
growth of the money base, then any inflation differential between themselves and the EU can be
seen as reflecting Balassa-Samuelson effects and the process of price convergence. Hence, such
a "revealed" measure of these two effects should not undermine the credibility of these counties'
peg to the Euro.   Following the ECB's policies on money supply growth will thus be the best
guarantee that the transition-economy members of the EU will achieve a measure of policy
convergence that will allow them, first, to maintain a credible peg against the Euro and,
eventually, to consider adopting the Euro as their currency as well.
In the empirical work reported in this paper, we focus on base money, the narrowest
monetary aggregate available. We choose this monetary aggregate over broader measures of
money supply for two reasons. The first is that we are concerned with policy convergence or the
domination of transition-economy monetary policy by the Bundesbank and, ultimately, by the
ECB. Consequently, we focus on that measure of money that best reflects the policy stance of the
monetary authorities, and base money serves this purpose better than do broader monetary
aggregates because it better captures central bank policy and is less diluted by the intervention of
other agents in the financial system. Moreover, broader measures of money are likely to
experience growth or contraction over time as the result of innovations in, or reforms of,  the
financial system, and we expect that such shocks will continue to be quite important in transition
economies. Thus, to maintain focus on central bank policies rather than on their outcomes, we
use base money as our monetary aggregate.9
The ability of these countries to follow the policy leadership of the ECB cannot be
determined directly, principally because the ECB has not been in existence long enough to
develop a sufficient track record of policy setting. However, it is commonly accepted that the
ECB hopes to follow rather conservative policies, reflecting in large part the approach of the
Bundesbank. At the same time, many of the transition economies did, at various times in the
1990s, maintain a peg or a crawling peg vis a vis the German mark. Consequently, if it can be
demonstrated that these economies were able to follow the leadership of the Bundesbank in
setting the growth of the base money stock, then we can have a high degree of confidence in the
ability of these countries to follow the leadership of the ECB in setting the same aggregate.
As McKinnon (1999) observes, such an exchange rate regime would resemble the
European Monetary System that was created in 1979 but with the Euro as the focus of the
exchange rate policies of the new members. Indeed, there would be two major differences
between the EMS and the new regime. The first is that the Euro would play an explicit role as the
currency to which nonEuro-zone EU members would peg. This would greatly simplify the task
of central banks relative to the EMS, where a system of cross rates had to be maintained by each
central bank. The second is that the monetary policy of the Euro zone, meaning the policy of the
European Central Bank, would come to dominate the policies of the central banks of the new
members. The latter would have “the primary responsibility of bending [their] monetary policy
by maintaining [the] exchange rate with the euro"… (McKinnon, 1999, p. 132).
If the central banks of the new members were to accept this role, as seems likely, they
would not only have to frame policies that were “dominated” by the goals of the ECB, but they
would also have to adopt similar tactics for pursuing these goals. The stated goal  of the ECB is
to follow a policy of medium-term price stability, with the goal set out in quantitative terms10
(ECB, 1998). To achieve its objectives, the ECB will focus on the growth of a reference
monetary aggregate and guide itself by a broadly based assessment of price developments.
Conceptually, the notion that the ECB’s policies will dominate those of the new EU
members may have much in common with the alleged domination of other European countries
by the Bundesbank in the EMS. This hypothesis of the German domination  or leadership in  the
EMS meant that other members of the EMS closely aligned their monetary policies to those of
Germany in order to benefit from the reputation of the Bundesbank and the credibility of its
policies.
4 Although the literature on this hypothesis did not reach a definitive conclusion as to the
existence of such leadership by the Bundesbank, it does raise the question of whether the new
members can successfully be “dominated” by the ECB, that is, whether they can successfully
mimic the ECB’s policies and gradually achieve the convergence between their rates of inflation
and those of Euro zone that will be necessary for their effective membership in the EU.
5
There is a number of conditions that the transition economies must meet if they are to
achieve such a convergence between themselves and the Euro zone. One is that they must have
the political will to do so, and their central banks must have the freedom to pursue appropriate
policies, and financial markets must be developed enough to provide for the effective
transmission of central bank policies to the economy.
6   Another is that they must choose the
appropriate indicator to which they will seek to converge.  The literature on German domination
of the EMS considered a number of macroeconomic aggregates or indicators, including interest
                                               
4 Whether following the Bundesbank's monetary policy in the absence of appropriate fiscal policy was sufficient to
maintain the EMS is a separate question.
5 See, for example, von Hagen and Fratianni (1990),  Karfakis and Moschos (1990), MacDonald and Taylor (1991),
Kutan (1991), Kirchgässner and Wolters (1993) , and Hafer, et al. (1997) for a sampling of methodologies and
conclusions.
6 For an assessment of these capabilities, see Kutan and Brada (2000).11
rates, the growth of the money stock, and exchange rates, as variables whose evolution could
shed light on German leadership. In the foregoing discussion, we have already explained why ,
in the case of the transition economies, some of these variables would be inappropriate indicators
of convergence. Consequently, we focus our inquiry on the stock of base money.
3. Tests of Bundesbank Domination of Candidate-Country Monetary Policy
Monthly data on base money in national currency units were obtained from line 14,
"reserve money", of the IMF’s IFS tape. Our sample of countries includes the leading Central
European transition-economy candidates for admission to the EU, two Baltic countries, Estonia
and Latvia, who are also likely to be considered for admission soon, and two Balkan countries,
Bulgaria and Romania, whose membership is some time off. We also included in our sample
Cyprus, Malta and Turkey, market economies that are also seeking to enter the EU as well as
Austria, Finland and Sweden. The former group of market economies is included in our sample
to enable us to determine whether market-economy candidates for EU membership are more
responsive to German monetary policy than are transition-economy candidates. The latter group
of market economies consists of the most recent members of the EU, and their inclusion will
enable us to judge the degree to which these countries' policies were dominated by German
monetary policy shortly before and then after their joining the EU.   We excluded data from the
pre-1993 period, both to avoid the early transition period and its financial chaos and to be able to
include the Czech and Slovak Republics in the analysis, and, in some cases, data availability
forced us to truncate the data set somewhat. The sample ends in 1998-2000 depending on data
availability.12
The data are set out in Figures 1-5. An examination of these Figures reveals some
significant similarities and differences among the groups of countries. The five transition-
economy candidates (Figure 1) exhibit growth of base money that is generally more rapid than
that of Germany and that also exhibits greater variance, especially in the early part of the sample.
Much the same observation applies for the two Baltic countries (Figure 5). By way of
comparison, with the exception of Sweden, which encountered considerable financial turbulence
in connection with its devaluation, the three most recent members of the EU show roughly
similar rates of growth as that of Germany and considerably less variation in base money than
the transition economies (Figure2). In the second half of the sample period, this description also
applies to Sweden. Of the non-transition countries seeking to join the EU (Figure  3), Cyprus and
Malta have rates of growth of base money that are somewhat greater than Germany's and that
exhibit variance similar to those of the front-running transition economies. Turkey is the obvious
outlier, with very rapid growth of base money. Finally, the two Balkan transition economies,
Bulgaria and Romania, exhibit somewhat different patterns (Figure 4). Romanian base money
grows at a rapid pace throughout the sample period, while Bulgaria's base money growth is
checked to some extent in the latter part of the period, perhaps as the result of the successful
introduction of a currency board.
A. The Long-Term Relationship between German and Transition-Economy Base
Money
The first step in our analysis is to determine the time-series characteristics of the data.13
As the relevant procedures are well known from the literature on the German domination of the
EMS cited above, we merely report that the series on base money, seasonally adjusted and in
logs, for the countries examined in this paper are all I(1), meaning that they must be first-
differenced  to make them  stationary.
7 These findings allow us to test whether each of the
candidate country's base money data are cointegrated with those of Germany. If such
cointegration exists, then there exists a long-term relationship between the two series, and the
two series will move together over time (Engle and Granger, 1987). Moreover, Engle and
Granger show that such cointegrated variables can be represented by an error-correction model
and that there must exist Granger causality (Granger, 1969) in at least one direction, that is from
one of the cointegrated variables to the other. Findings of cointegration mean that the candidate
country's base money stock responds to changes in the base money stock of Germany, and that,
thus, in the language of the literature, the base money stock of the candidate country is Granger
caused or "dominated" by Germany. 
8
We employed the Phillips-Perron  test for cointegration (Phillips and Perron, 1988). This
test is based on a correction of the t-statistic for the test coefficient on the assumption that the
series are characterized by higher-order serial correlation. This correction is nonparametric, and
it is robust to autocorrelation of unknown form and as well as to heteroskedasticity. We also
employed the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test (Dickey and Fuller, 1981), but this test was
                                               
7 Because, as Elliott et al. (1996) show, there is no uniformly most powerful test for this problem, we used both the
Dickey-Fuller(1979) and  Phillips-Perron (1988) tests. Both yielded similar results. While the sample period may be
viewed as short by time series standards, the acceptance of the test results needs to be viewed as much in the light of
the decisiveness of the test statistics as in the light of the length of the sample. Test results are available upon
request.
8 We do not test here the hypothesis that there is Granger causality running in the other direction, that is, from the
base money of candidate countries to that of Germany. Both in terms of the size of the candidate countries vis a vis
Germany and in terms of their influence on German policy making, such Granger causality seems implausible.14
less powerful in most cases than the PP test, and thus we do not report the ADF results.
Although Gonzalo (1994) suggests that the Johansen (1988) test may be more powerful than the
two step method used here to identify cointegration, this applies only if there is a need to identify
multiple cointegrating vectors. In our bivariate model there can be at most one cointegrating
vector. Moreover, if the variables are cointegrated, then OLS estimates, as obtained in this paper,
are "super-consistent" estimates of the cointegrating parameters.  In addition, Stock (1987)
demonstrates that that the OLS estimates of the cointegrating parameters generated by our
approach converge more rapidly than do estimates in  OLS models using stationary variables.
Nevertheless, because any errors in step one of our two-step procedure could be carried over to
step two, we also used the Johnasen test, and the results of  support the conclusions drawn from
our two-step procedure.
9
Table 1 reports the PP test statistics for cointegration between the base money series of
the sample countries and Germany. It also gives the sample period for each country. Although
the critical values for the PP statistics are precisely those given for the DF tests, the DF critical
values are generally not valid for PP cointegration tests. This is so because Engle and Granger's
(1987) two-step method amounts to testing for a unit root in the residuals of a first stage
regression, but, because these residuals are estimates of the disturbance term, the asymptotic
distribution of the test statistic differs from the one for ordinary series. Therefore, the DF critical
values are not appropriate for unit root tests in the residuals of a regression. Engle and Yoo
(1987, Table 2) provide the correct critical values. Consequently, we use the appropriate critical
values provided by Engle and Yoo in Table 1. In addition, because the critical values are
sensitive to the presence of a constant and/or a trend term and number of lags used in
                                               
9 The results of these tests are available from the authors.15
estimations, we first tested the significance of these terms and also used a standard model
selection procedure to select an appropriate number of lags. The latter is based upon Akaike's
information criterion. The details are reported in Table 1.
Among the Central European transition-economy candidates for membership in the EU,
three, the Czech and Slovak Republics and Slovenia exhibit cointegration between their base
money stock and that of Germany, while the hypothesis of cointegration is rejected for Poland
and Hungary. These results suggest that the ability or willingness to follow German monetary
policy is not tied to any particular exchange rate regime. For example, the Czech Republic
pegged its currency to the dollar and the DM and then abandoned the peg in 1997 in favor of a
float.
10 The Slovak Republic maintained a peg against the dollar and DM, while Slovenia
operated a managed float. Hungary and Poland, on the other hand have maintained a crawling
peg, with Poland's weighed more heavily against the dollar and recently operating with a
widened band. It may be that the crawl allowed their central banks to avoid the need to follow
German monetary policy as closely as did the three other countries.  Turning to the Baltic
countries, Estonia's cointegration comes as no surprise given its peg to the DM and its strong
currency board arrangement. Latvia, which informally shadowed the SDR through a managed
float, on the other hand, displays no cointegration with German monetary policy.  For the Balkan
countries, Bulgaria and Romania, the hypothesis of cointegration with the German money base is
rejected, a result that is consistent with their difficulties in stabilizing their economies.
The results for the non-transition economies are less mixed. Of the three non-transition
candidates for EU membership, two, Cyprus and Malta, and the three most recent EU members,
Austria, Finland and Sweden, all exhibit cointegration between their base money stocks and that
                                               
10 Although the koruna was floated, the Czech National Bank sought to maintain a stable relationship against the
DM.16
of Germany. Indeed, for Austria and Finland, the PP test statistic is quite high, and that of
Sweden would doubtless also be higher were we to exclude the period of financial turmoil
surrounding that country's devaluation. Only for Turkey in this group of countries can we reject
the hypothesis of German domination, a result unsurprising from an examination of Figure 3.
The domination by Germany of the monetary policy of the most recent members of the
EU and of two of the non-market economy candidates for EU membership is strong evidence
that participation in the EU, and eventually, in the Euro zone, will require the domination of the
ECB over the monetary policies of new members. In this regard, the mixed results for the
transition economies must be interpreted with some caution. If their failure to follow the policy
making leadership of the Bundesbank is due to the desire of monetary authorities in these
transition economies to achieve alternative economic goals, such as the stimulation of growth
and economic restructuring at a rate that exceeds that of EU countries or the lowering of inflation
at a pace that differs from that of Germany, then EU membership on the basis of a framework
such as that proposed by McKinnon might still be possible. If these countries do have the central
bank independence and sufficiently developed financial markets to align their monetary policies
to those of the ECB, then it may be possible for them to do so on the eve of their accession to
membership. This may well be the case for Hungary and Poland, countries that have achieved
very high rates of growth of output but that have central banks that are both independent and
well run and that are serious about following anti-inflationary policies. Even in the case of these
countries, however, one should be cautious. The examples of the market economy candidates as
well as those of the three recent members of the EU show convergence with German monetary17
policy over the entire sample period, suggesting, perhaps, that a such a long period of policy
convergence is appropriate and necessary for countries seeking to join the EU.
 The policy conclusions are more discouraging for countries with central banks that are
less independent and whose financial systems are weaker, such as Bulgaria and Romania among
the transition economies and Turkey among the market-economy candidates.  If the failure to
follow German policy is due to their central bank's inability or lack of freedom to implement the
appropriate monetary policy or to control the stock of base money, then, for these countries, the
results above serve as a strong warning sign on the road to EU membership.
B. The Short-Run Dynamics of the German-Transition Economy Base Money
Relationship
As mentioned above, if two series are cointegrated, then there exists an error-correction
representation of the relationship between the first differences of the two series. The error
correction term measures how rapidly the money base in the candidate country reacts to
deviations from the long term relationship between the two money stocks.  We therefore
estimated the standard VAR specification augmented by an error correction term for each of the
countries for which we accepted the cointegration hypothesis. Table 2 reports the results of the
regressions as specified by Equation 1:
￿  Mx,t  = cx +  ￿ i ￿ x,t-i ￿  M x, t-i  +  ￿ i ￿ x,t-i ￿  M Germany, t-i  +   ￿ x ECx,t-1  +  ￿ x,t   
Eq. 1
where M is the logarithm of the stock of base money of country x in national units, and EC is the
difference between that country's actual base money stock and its base money stock as predicted18
by the long-run relationship between the logarithm of the country's stock of base money and that
of Germany. In this specification, the evolution of the growth of the national stock of base
money depends on the magnitude of the coefficient of the error correction term, ￿ , on the
persistence of domestic monetary policy as given by ￿ i ￿ x,t-i,  and on the responses of the country
to short term fluctuations in German monetary policy as given by ￿ i ￿ x,t-i  .  We set t equal to 12,
meaning that changes in national and German money stocks were lagged for 12 months, but, in
several cases, a likelihood ratio test indicated that a lag of only 6 months yielded satisfactory
results, and we thus opted for the more parsimonious specification. For several countries, a
dummy variable was used to capture a structural break caused by turbulence, change in exchange
rate regime, etc. These dummy variables and the time period they cover are also reported in
Table 2.
11
The greater the value of ￿ , the more rapidly a country's monetary authorities react to any
divergence in the long-term relationship between their base money stock and that of Germany.
An examination of Table 2 reveals significant differences between the three categories of
countries as well as some differences within each category. Of the three EU member countries,
Austria and Finland react the most rapidly to disturbances in the long-run relationship between
their money base and that of Germany. The time needed to eliminate the gap ranges from slightly
over one month for Austria to about 7 months for Sweden, with Finland adjusting in about 3
months.   Malta and Cyprus, the market-economy candidates for EU membership, adjust in about
6 and 9 months, respectively, perhaps because, not being members yet, they do not perceive the
                                               
11 One dummy that we did not incorporate was a dummy for the formation of the Euro zone. A referee suggested
that this change in regime should also be represented by a dummy. However, a Chow test showed no structural
breaks in either German monetary policy or in that of the countries whose results would have been changed by the
inclusion of this dummy. Moreover, including the dummies makes it more likely that the dominance hypothesis will
be accepted. Indeed, by including the dummies, the results change to the extent that we accept cointegration between
German and Hungarian money stock series.19
need for as close a coordination with the Bundesbank's policies as is the case for the EU member
countries in our sample. The somewhat larger sample of transition economies yields a range of
estimates of adjustment time that ranges from 3 months for Slovakia to almost 10 months for
Slovenia. The former country’s close adherence to German monetary policy may be somewhat
surprising, as neither Slovakia's central bank nor its financial system have the strong
international reputation enjoyed by the central banks and financial markets of its transition-
economy neighbors. Thus, the close tracking of German policy trends may reflect the reluctance
of Slovak monetary authorities to follow a policy that diverges too much from those of Germany,
its largest trading partner, and of its neighbor, Austria, which, as we have seen above, also hews
closely to the Bundesbank's policies. It may also reflect a lack of confidence on the part of the
Slovak central bank in pursuing a more independent policy. Nevertheless, we note that,
compared to its transition-economy neighbors, Slovakia's economic performance in terms of
growth of output, inflation and export performance have been more than creditable.  The other
two transition economies, the Czech Republic and Estonia, respond within a period of seven
months, a span only marginally longer than that of the Malta, but significantly longer than that of
the EU member countries, Austria and Finland. Overall, there is a rough but clearly positive
correlation between the intensity of the relationship that a country has with the EU and the speed
with which that country's monetary authorities act to eliminate divergences in the long-term
relationship between their money base and that of Germany.  Nevertheless, those transition
economies whose monetary policies are dominated by the Bundesbank tend to react more slowly
to divergences between the long-term trends in their monetary polices and those of the
Bundesbank than do the market economies in our sample.20
Even if candidate countries do not maintain a fixed long-run relationship between their
base money stocks and that of Germany, they may choose to follow the policy lead of the
Bundesbank by shadowing the short-term fluctuations in German policy. To do this, they would
expand their stock of base money in response to the Bundesbank's decisions to increase the
growth of Germany's stock of base money, and they would slow the growth of their base money
stock when the Bundesbank does so. Evidence of such short term coordination would be that the
coefficients in Equation 1 that reflect the influence of lagged German money growth on the
growth of a country's money stock, ￿ i ￿ x,t-i ,would be positive and significant.
The results of this hypothesis test are reported in Table 3. The values of ￿ i ￿ x,t-I  for those
countries whose money stock is cointegrated with that of Germany are drawn from Table 2;
those for the other countries in our sample are drawn from a VAR specification that is identical
to Equation 1, with the exception of the error-correction term, which is absent for these
countries.  Panel C of Table 3 reveals that Finland and Sweden do respond to short-term changes
in German monetary policy, although Finland does so in a way that offsets rather than reinforces
German short-term policy decisions. That Austria does not appear react to short-term swings in
German monetary policy.  This finding is not surprising given the speed with which Austria
adjusts to any disturbance in the long-term relationship between its monetary policy and that of
Germany. Cyprus and Malta, the two cointegrated market-economy candidates, also track short-
term fluctuations in German monetary policy. By way of contrast, none of the transition-
economy countries who follow German monetary policy in the long run respond to short-run
swings in the growth of the German money base (Table 3, panel A). Finally, of the countries that
exhibit no long-run ties to German monetary policy (Panel B) only two, Bulgaria and Turkey,
respond to short-run variations in the German monetary base.21
These results mirror those regarding the long-term relationship between German
monetary policy and that of candidate countries. The recent EU members have a stronger tie to
German policy in the short run, as do the two non-transition candidates, Cyprus and Malta. The
transition economy candidates are less strongly connected to German policy in the short-run,
much as in the long run.
4. Conclusions
The motivation for our inquiry was the observation that membership in the EU for both
transition and market economy countries will yield mutual benefits only if an exchange rate
regime between new members and the Euro-zone countries can be worked out that will be
acceptable to both sides. A necessary, if not sufficient, condition for the long-term viability of
such a regime is that the new members be able to follow the lead of the ECB in setting their
monetary policy. Our results show that such domination of national monetary policy by the
Bundesbank, which we see as a proxy for the ECB, quite clearly characterizes the behavior of the
most recent members of the EU, Austria, Finland and Sweden. We also find a strong connection
between the Bundesbank's policies and those of Cyprus and Malta,  two of the market economy
candidates for EU membership. Among the transition economies, the ability to follow the
policies of the Bundesbank is weaker or, for some countries, not in all cases those that are the
most backward in their stabilization and transformation efforts, nonexistent. While we cannot
conclude that the failure to follow German monetary policy closely or not at all by the transition
economies is an absolute barrier to their joining the EU, such weak policy coordination may
reflect the need for a further building up the financial sectors of these countries as well as the22
need for a period in which these countries do tie their policies more closely  to that of the ECB
before they join the EU.
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Table 1 – Bivariate Cointegration Tests
Phillips-Perron  (PP) Test Statistics on Estimated Residuals
1
Panel A: EU Candidates
Country PP test statistic Sample Period
Bulgaria -1.68 93:01-98:11
Cyprus -1.98** 93:12-00:02







Slovak Rep. -3.66* 93:01-00:02
Slovenia -2.57** 93:01-00:02
Turkey -1.52 93:01-99:11
Panel B: Recent EU Members





1.  The reported test statistics are based on the residuals from the following long run equation:
Log Xt = a + b log(German monetary base) t + et,
where X represents the monetary base for an individual country under investigation and e is the
error term . Cointegration requires that the error term be stationary. Following Engle and Yoo
(1987)'s suggestion, up to 12 lags were initially included in unit-root tests for the error term, and
the optimal lag length was chosen based on Akaike's information criterion (AIC). A lag length of
three was found to be the optimal lag length in all cases, with the exception of Slovakia for
which 6 lags were used.
2. Because the critical values are sensitive to the presence of a constant and/or trend term,
cointegration tests were initially conducted using the following three models: model 1
includes a time trend and a constant term; model 2 has a constant term only; model 3 has
neither time trend nor constant. The test statistics reported above are based on the best25
fitting model. In all cases, model 3 was the best fit except for Finland, for which model 1 was
chosen.
* and **  denote significance at the 1% and 5% level respectively.
Table 2: Error Correction Estimates






Constant     0.01   0.04** -0.01  0.04**  0.08*** -0.05**
Ger (t-1)   -0.92**  -0.73  0.64***  -1.78  0.46 -0.43
Ger (t-2)   -0.17   1.70  1.11**  -2.49 -0.19  1.43*
Ger (t-3)    0.21   0.28  0.64   0.65  0.37  0.55
Ger (t-4)    1.12*  -0.77  0.74  1.78 -0.39  0.32
Ger (t-5)    0.71**  -1.34*** -0.37  2.10 -1.05  0.60
Ger (t-6)   -0.07    0.31  0.27 -0.17 -1.26  0.35
Ger (t-7)   -1.01***  -0.91 -1.03 -1.49 -0.91    -
Ger (t-8)   -1.46**  -0.68 -0.74 -2.39 -1.16    -
Ger (t-9)   -1.30**  -1.33 -0.34 -4.90** -0.35    -
Ger (t-10)    -1.61**  -1.63  1.13 -4.04*** -1.81    -
Ger (t-11)     0.46   0.16  0.07 -0.68  0.41    -
Ger (t-12)     0.36   0.09  0.85*** -0.21 -0.55    -
Own (t-1)     0.15  -0.58*  0.17 -0.16 -0.70*  0.07
Own (t-2)     0.25**  -0.08 -0.05  0.16 -0.27  0.01
Own (t-3)   -0.16***  -0.20  0.33**  0.17  0.17  0.02
Own (t-4)    0.15  -0.21  0.14  0.15  0.09 -0.03
Own (t-5)    0.24**   0.03  0.31***  0.15  0.14 -0.01
Own (t-6)    0.01   0.02  0.10  0.21  0.08  0.02
Own (t-7)    0.16***  -0.07 -0.01  0.02 -0.19    -
Own (t-8)    0.07   0.05 -0.09 -0.08 -0.21    -
Own (t-9)    0.03  -0.04  0.15  0.06  0.28**    -
Own (t-10)    0.05   0.42** -0.13  0.08  0.24***    -
Own (t-11)    0.04   0.08  0.08 -0.04  0.10    -
Own (t-12)   -0.01  -0.25  0.04  0.03 -0.02    -
Error corr.  -0.14**  -0.14** -0.17*  -0.34** -0.10*** -0.11*
Adj. R
2   0.34   0.49  0.15  0.09  0.53  0.1926
Table 2 Continued: Error Correction Estimates
Panel B:  Recent EU Members
Variable  Austria Finland Sweden
Constant  0.01    0.01   0.02
Ger (t-1) -1.13*  -1.15*   1.27***
Ger (t-2) -0.48  -1.53***   1.36**
Ger (t-3) -0.08  -0.30  -0.18
Ger (t-4) -0.07  -0.04   0.21
Ger (t-5) -0.01   1.03   0.60
Ger (t-6)  0.01   0.66   0.33
Ger (t-7)  0.43   0.27    -
Ger (t-8) -0.30  -0.59    -
Ger (t-9)  0.05  -0.92***    -
Ger (t-10) -0.43  -0.44    -
Ger (t-11) -0.24  -0.15    -
Ger (t-12) -0.76*  -0.47    -
Own (t-1)  0.45  -0.10   0.27**
Own (t-2)  0.42  -0.18   0.25*
Own (t-3)  0.43   0.06   0.16*
Own (t-4)  0.45**   0.27**  -0.32*
Own (t-5)  0.41   0.23***   0.07
Own (t-6)  0.33   0.30***   0.22***
Own (t-7)  0.22   0.15   -
Own (t-8)  0.21   0.18***   -
Own (t-9)  0.07   0.12   -
Own (t-10) -0.08   0.08   -
Own (t-11) -0.09   0.18**   -
Own (t-12) 0.86*   0.20**   -
Error corr. -0.64**  -0.31*  -0.14*
Adj. R
2 0.81   0.32   0.42
Notes:
1. The reported significance levels are based on the Newey-West (1987) heteroskedasticity and
autocorrelation consistent standard errors. *, **, and*** denote significance levels at 1,5, and 10 percent
level, respectively.
2. For some countries, there was a break in the monetary base growth rates, and we used a (0,1) dummy
variable to capture the break. These include Sweden (zero until 97:02 and 1 afterwards), Slovenia (zero
until 95:03 and 1 afterwards), Cyprus (zero until 95:12 and 1 afterwards), and the Czech Republic (May
1997=1, and zero otherwise).27
Table 3 - Short-Run Dynamics
chi-square test statistics for the significance of  German money  growth coefficients
in  individual  money base growth equations
Panel A: EU Candidate Countries Cointegrated with Germany
Variable Sum of coefficients Chi-Square test stat.
Cyprus    2.86 2.84 (0.09)***
Czech Republic   -3.69 1.47 (0.22)
Estonia   -4.69 1.08 (0.30)
Malta    2.98 9.13 (0.00)*
Slovak Republic -13.63 2.30 (0.13)
Slovenia   -6.46 2.00 (0.16)
Panel B: EU Candidate Countries not Cointegrated with Germany
Variable Sum of coefficients Chi-Square test stat.
Bulgaria     8.78 7.07 (0.00)*
Hungary   -1.46 2.07 (0.15)
Latvia     0.91 0.22 (0.64)
Poland     0.06 0.01 (0.96)
Romania     1.43 0.41 (0.52)
Turkey     3.27 2.68 (0.10)***
Panel C: Recent EU Members
Variable Sum of coefficients Chi-Square test stat.
Austria   -3.02 2.36 (0.12)
Finland   -4.03 6.98 (0.00)*
Sweden    3.59 6.21 (0.01)*
Notes:
1. The number of lagged German money coefficients used for Panel A and C countries are based on
those reported in Table 2, while 12 lags are used for Panel B countries.
2. P-values are in parentheses. *, **, *** as in Table 2.
3.   In estimations, we also accounted for a structural break for the following Panel B countries:
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